POL 23-7 UVOLTA

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Control: 3693
Jan. 6, 1966, 11:47AM

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C O N F I D E N T I A L JANUARY 6.

REF: EMBTEL 230 — POL 23-9 UVOLTA

DEPT PASS OTHER AF POSTS AS APPROPRIATE.

1. CHIEF STATE COL LAMIZANA ANNOUNCED 1300 JAN 5 CONSTITUTION SUSPENDED, NATIONAL ASSEMBLY DISSOLVED, AND THAT HE ASSUMING LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE POWERS UNTIL CIRCUMSTANCES PERMIT RESTORATION REPUBLICAN INSTITUTIONS. LATER PUBLISHED GENERAL STATEMENT MADE PERSONALLY TO ASSEMBLED TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATORS (COMMANDANTS DE CERCLE AND CHEFS DES CIRCONSCRIPTIONS) INSTRUCTING THEM CONTINUE NORMAL FUNCTIONS AND MAINTENANCE ORDER. MORNING

PAGE TWO RUEHCR 053GP C O N F I D E N T I A L
JAN 6, RADIO BROADCAST TELEGRAMS SUPPORT FROM SEVERAL COMMANDANTS DE CERCLE. THERE NO INDICATION ANY OPPOSITION OR LACK SUPPORT FOR LAMIZANA THROUGHOUT COUNTRY.

2. COMITE D'ACTION, WHICH PROVIDED MAIN ORGANIZATION AND IMPETUS FOR COUP, APPEARS REGARD COL LAMIZANA'S ANNOUNCEMENTS AS FULFILLMENT ITS BASIC DEMANDS (EMBTEL 252).

SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD EMBOFF COL LAM ZANA HAD ACCEPTED THEIR MAIN POINTS AND THAT UNIONISTS SATISFIED LEAVE THEIR EXECUTION TO HIM. EXPECTED THERE WOULD BE COMPLETE TURNOVER IN MINISTERS. NEW NOMINEES TO SERVE PROVISIONALLY UNTIL ELECTIONS.

3. COMITE WOULD BE EXPANDED BY ADDITION UNIONISTS FROM AREAS OUTSIDE CAPITAL; POLITICIANS AND OTHER NON-UNIONISTS WOULD NOT BE INCLUDED. SHOWED GREAT INTEREST MAINTAINING INTER-UNION SOLIDARITY ACHIEVED DURING GENERAL STRIKE AND

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SAID WERE CONSCIOUSLY AVOIDING FURTHER POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT WHICH POTENTIALLY DIVISIVE.

4. [redacted] STATES HIS EMBASSY HESITANT HOW EVALUATE BALANCE MILITARY-CIVIL INFLUENCE IN PRESENT SITUATION.

PAGE THREE RUEHCR WPTEGP C O N F I D E N T I A L
HE HAD ONLY PARTIAL INFORMATION ON COMITE D'ACTION MEMBERSHIP AND DEMANDS, APPARENTLY OBTAINED THROUGH MILITARY RATHER THAN LABOR SOURCES, AND EXMRESSED GREAT INTEREST BOTH LISTS. CONSIDERED COL LAMIZANA BASICALLY "BRAVE SOLDAT" TYPE, WHO HAD ACCEPTED RESPONSIBILITY CHIEF STATE RELUCTANTLY, WAS PRIMARILY INTERESTED MAINTENANCE ORDER, AND WAS UNLIKELY STEP OUT OF ARMS ROLE LONGER THAN NECESSARY. EMPHASIZED, HOWEVER, LAMIZANA ACCUSTOMED COMMAND. SAW TO EXECUTION HIS ORDERS, AND NOT MAN TO BE PUSHED AROUND.

5. SITUATION APPEARS EVOLVING ALONG LINES DAHOMEY COUP 1963 WHEN GENERAL SOGLO ASSUMED POWER FOR SEVERAL MONTHS UNDER PRESSURE DISSATISFIED LABOR AND CCVIL SERVICE ELEMENTS UNTIL POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS REESTABLISHED BY ELECTIONS. AS LAMIZANA APPEARED INCLINED EXERCISE MINIMUM INTERNAL POLITICAL AND FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVE, AND [redacted] STATES HE HAS NO STAFF CAPABLE HELP HIM THIS RESPECT IF DID, COUNTRY'S POLICIES LIKELY BE FROZEN UNTIL NEW MINISTERS SELECTED.

6. GOVT TURNOVER MAY NOT BE AS COMPLETE AS COMITE D'ACTION WISHES. SEVERAL FORMER MINISTERS GENERALLY RECOGNIZED AS ONLY REALLY COMPETENT PERSONNEL THEIR FIELDS AND LAMIZANA NOT UNLIKELY WISH

PAGE FOUR RUEHCR Ø53GP C O N F I D E N T I A L
RETAIN THEM ON ADMINISTRATIVE GROUNDS. IF COMITE MAINTAINS HANDS-OFFAPPROACH INDICATED BY KABORE, WOULD EXPECT OVERALL MODERATE GOVT LINE EMERGE.

GP-3. ROBERTS
BT

NOTE: Advance copy to S/S-O at 1:05 PM, Passed,White House at 1:30 PM, 1/6/66.